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ABSTRACT 
 
The German federal system is conventionally understood as highly coordinated 
between federal and regional governments and aimed at producing a ‘uniformity’ of living 
conditions. This view has increasingly been challenged as new work focuses on innovation 
and diversity at the regional level, and also as a consequence of reforms to the federal system 
that took place in 2006. This article attempts to establish a more systematic basis for 
assessing and explaining the scope and significance of regional policy variation in Germany. 
Our findings suggest that - despite institutional structures that foster intense coordination 
between central and regional governments and apparent popular preferences for uniformity of 
policy outcomes- the extent of policy variation in Germany is much greater than 
conventionally understood and driven both by structural factors and partisan choices at the 
regional level.  
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INTRODUCTION – SHIFTING PARADIGMSOF GERMAN FEDERALISM 
 
We know that many policy competences have been dispersed from central to regional 
levels of government over the last forty years (Hooghe, Marks and Schakel 2008). We know 
rather less about how far growth in regional competence brings with it differences in policy 
outcomes in different regional jurisdictions in the same state. There has been substantial work 
on this question in the mature federations of North America (e.g. Harrison 2006; Karch 
2007). Such work is much less advanced in Europe, either in recently decentralised states or 
mature federations like Germany. This article attempts to establish a more systematic 
empirical basis for assessing the scope and significance of regional policy variation in 
Germany. It presents data on the extent of regional variation in policy outcomes in selected 
policy fields, and explores how far these variations can be explained by economic, 
institutional and party-political factors.1  
Our finding is that - despite institutional structures that foster intense coordination 
between central and regional governments designed to secure (as the German constitution 
puts it) ‘uniformity of living conditions’, and despite apparent popular preferences for 
uniformity of policy outcomes- the extent of policy variation in Germany is greater than 
conventionally understood. There is, to adopt the language of this special issue, a greater 
depth of power dispersion in Germany than hitherto appreciated. We find that variation is 
driven not just by structural conditions beyond the control of governments, but also by 
politics. Parties, as Castles and McKinlay (1979) concluded in a different context over thirty 
years ago, do matter. These findings raise questions about the need for, and efficacy and 
limitations of, the mechanisms for statewide coordination between governments and for 
control over policy outcomes that are such a distinctive feature of German federalism. They 
challenge the conventional understanding of German federalism. This understanding is 
framed by a powerful intellectual paradigm that marks Germany out as an unusually unitarist 
– or controlled – form of federalism geared to uniformity of policy outcomes across the 
federation.  
This paradigm was defined in early postwar assessments (Wheare 1953), and has 
periodically been asserted afresh, for example in Hesse’s (1962) depiction of a ‘unitary 
federal state’, the assessments in the mid-1970s by Scharpf (1976) of entangled policy-
making and Lehmbruch (1976) of the integration of party competition across the federal and 
Länder levels, Abromeit’s (1992) analysis of post-unification continuities, and Scharpf’s 
(2008) more recent reaffirmation of those continuities. It has survived the implementation of 
federalism reforms in 2006 (cf. Burkhart 2008; Scheller and Schmid 2008; Scharpf 2009) 
which were designed to ‘disentangle’ the federal and Land levels and increase Länder policy 
autonomy, extending the scope of power dispersion in Germany.  
The conventional paradigm of German federalism focuses on: 
• the functional distribution of responsibilities in which the federal level makes most 
laws and the Länder implement most of those laws; 
• the close involvement of the Bundesrat (the federal parliamentary chamber 
comprised of Länder governments) in the federal legislative process; and 
• the presumption that policy standards (‘living conditions’) experienced by all citizens 
should be ‘uniform’ irrespective of location.  
This paradigm tends to discount the Länder as significant venues for policy-making, 
instead focusing on their ‘entanglement’ (Verflechtung) in politics at the federal level. It 
views politics in the Länder as a subordinate reflection of federal-level politics. Perhaps the 
pithiest summary of this paradigm is that by Scharpf (2008: 510): 
The post-war German polity is a federal state with a unitary political culture … there 
are no politically salient territorial cleavages … and no popular demands for regional 
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autonomy. Mass communication is dominated by nationwide media; political issues 
are defined and debated nationally; and public attention is focused on national parties 
even where they compete for office in the Länder. By contrast, the political salience of 
policy-making at the regional level is quite low, and the 16 Land elections have the 
character of ‘second-order national elections’ as parties tend to fight over national 
policy choices and about the performance of the national government. 
 
The continued dominance of the uniformity paradigm is surprising given significant 
work over the last thirty-plus years focusing on innovation and difference in Länder politics 
(Mintzel 1977; Schmidt 1980; Benz 1985; Schmid 1990; Götz 1992; Sturm 1999a). More 
recently new research has pinpointed Land-by-Land variations in parties and party systems 
(Jun, Haas and Niedermayer 2008; Bräuninger and Debus 2012; Debus and Müller 2013; 
Müller 2013; Seher and Pappi 2011), coalition formation (Bräuninger and Debus 2008; 
Oberhofer and Sturm 2010), voting behaviour (Hough and Jeffery 2003; Völkl et al. 2008), 
institutions of government (Leunig 2006; Freitag and Vatter 2008), and public policy 
outcomes (Hildebrandt and Wolf 2008; Turner 2011; Tepe and Vanhuysse 2013).  
There is now, in other words, a robust alternative paradigm of diversity and difference 
which in part recognises diversity that has always existed but rarely been recognised, and in 
part reflects the blindingly obvious: that after German unification in 1990 Germany exhibits 
much wider regional disparities on most significant socio-economic and political indicators 
than before 1990 (Benz 1999; Auel 2010; Jeffery and Rowe 2014). Even if a ‘uniformity’ of 
living conditions had once been possible – which is doubtful – it is not now. 
EXPLORING VARIATION IN POLICY OUTCOMES 
 
 This article uses data on the territorial diversity of policy outcomes in Germany both 
to challenge the residual imagery of uniformity, but also to deepen the alternative 
understanding signalled by recent emphasis on diversity and difference. To put it in the terms 
of this special issue: there has long been a normative assumption in work on German 
federalism (and perhaps also in the way this special issue assumes that central governments 
should seek to coordinate and control their former competences as they disperse to other 
levels of government?) that federal coordination of governmental activity and control over 
policy outcomes is right, and better than the alternative of regional variation. As Sturm 
(1999b: 85) once put it ‘regional diversity seemed to be something obsolete, which had to be 
overcome’. But why should not regional governments in Germany also be able to deliver 
‘right’ and - or perhaps even ‘better’ - outcomes for citizens? Our aim is to open up a 
research agenda on how far (and why) the German federal system, as well as being a locus of 
policy entanglement in federal policy-making, is also a locus for distinctive policies in the 
Länder. We deliberately stress ‘as well as’ and ‘also’; our aim is not to dismiss 
understandings of German federalism as the coordinated pursuit of uniform living conditions, 
but to reveal other facets of German federalism that at the same time foster diversity of living 
conditions. Insofar as such other facets are significant – or, given conditions since 1990, 
inevitable –questions open up about how far federal institutions should coordinate and control 
competences exercised by Länder governments. We return to this point at the end of the 
article. 
 We focus on an illustrative set of policy outcome indicators that reveal significant 
differences across the Länder. Our aim is both to document these differences – as such 
empirical work has rarely been done in any systematic way in the German case – but also to 
begin to explain why those differences occur. We recognise that policy outcomes are not 
simply the result of what governments do, but are also affected by many other factors. We 
attempt to capture at least some of these factors in the explanatory models presented later in 
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this article and in the associated online appendices. Our focus on outcomes (rather than 
outputs like decisions on public spending on particular policies) is deliberate, because 
regional variation in policy outcomes jars with one aspect of the uniformity paradigm that 
remains largely unchallenged: the German public’s strong expectations of uniformity of 
outcomes. Recent work on public attitudes on German federalism has revealed a striking 
paradox: citizens combine a ‘pronounced preference for a greater role of regional institutions 
in policy-making’ alongside generally overwhelming preferences for statewide uniformity of 
policy outcomes (Oberhofer et al. 2013: 104-6). Citizens appear to want the Länder to do 
more, but not to do it differently. With this paradox in mind, building a clearer understanding 
of policy difference, and the role of Länder governments in producing it, appears important in 
establishing a more nuanced understanding of the way the German federal system and its 
mechanisms of coordination and control operate.  
 We present below data on the extent of policy difference in the Länder in: 
• prison occupancy rates2; 
• salary levels for public servants (Beamte)3;  
• naturalisation rates4; and 
• university enrolment rates5 
 These four areas were chosen for two reasons. The first was to cover areas in which 
the depth of Länder competence differs, distinguishing fields under their own legislative 
responsibility from others in which they implement federal law with administrative 
discretion. For example, naturalisation is regulated by federal law, but is applied in the 
Länder with discretion exercised by Länder and local governments, including the length of 
the naturalisation process, the requirements for information in support of the application, the 
atmosphere (positive or hostile) created amongst officialdom, and also legal interpretation 
(Thränhardt, 2008). By contrast, secondary education (of which university enrolment is an 
outcome) has always been an exclusive legislative responsibility of the Länder. It might be 
expected that there would be more regional variations in outcomes where the Länder have 
autonomous legislative competences, rather than where they act as venues of implementation. 
 Second, we chose two areas in which the Länder received fuller competences 
following the 2006 federalism reforms. We would expect to see more variation following 
reform than before. Prior to 2006, prison law was decided at the federal level, with the 
Länder responsible for the implementation. In 2006 the Länder received full legislative 
responsibility for prisons– and quickly made use of this competence with new divergences in 
the aims of punishment, cell size, entitlement to therapy, the role of work in prisons, and rules 
on remand (Ostendorf 2012). Additionally, pay for public servants known as Beamte – 
hitherto determined by federal law, albeit with some variations possible from 2004 onwards – 
became an exclusive competence of the Länder as a result of the 2006 federalism reforms.  
 In the terms of this special issue, then, we have one area of policy which sees 
‘delegation’ (naturalisation), and three which are examples of ‘transfer’ of power, of which 
one (university enrolment) has consistently been a Land competence, while two have seen a 
recent shift into Land competence (Beamte pay, and prisons). In the case of prisons, because 
earlier responsibility for policy implementation lay with the Länder, there has been a shift 
from ‘delegation’ to ‘transfer’, while Beamte pay shifted directly from central control to 
‘transfer’. 
Table 1: Indicators of Policy Variation 
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum N 
Prison Occupancy Rate 0.92 0.10 0.60 1.19 160 
Beamte Pay Level 1651.10 107.15 1464.89 1965.27 160 
4 
 
Naturalisation Rate 1.43 0.57 0.41 3.08 128 
University Enrolment Rate 75.50 7.03 60.30 93.70 128 
 
 Table 1 summarises the extent of variation of these indicators across the Länder; 
Figures 1 and 2 show variation by Land over time, and by year. Prison occupancy data run 
from 2001-10 and are measured as the number of prisoners relative to prison capacity. To an 
extent prison occupancy is determined by longer term issues about the building of prisons and 
patterns of sentencing; but Figures 1 and, especially, 2 reveal substantial short-term variation 
in occupancy that would appear not simply to reflect longer term infrastructure decisions or 
sentencing cultures. The lowest occupancy rate across this period was 60.1% in Hamburg in 
2008 and the highest was 119% in Thüringen in 2005.  
 The Beamte salary data (in Euros/month) are for level A5-1 and run from 2003-12.6 
Pay and bonuses were set uniformly until 2003. From 2004, the Länder could determine 
Christmas bonuses and holiday pay. In 2006 complete control over pay levels shifted to the 
Länder. In 2012 pay levels ranged from 1672.80 Euros/month in Berlin to 1965.27 in 
Hamburg. Naturalisation rate data run from 2003-10 and are measured as the proportion of 
the foreign population that was naturalised in each Land in a given year. The lowest rate was 
in Saxony in 2004 at 0.41% and the highest in Schleswig-Holstein in 2004 at 3.08%. 
University enrolment data (the proportion of eligible students enrolling in university), run 
from 2001-10 with data unavailable for 2007 and 2009. The lowest enrolment rate was in 
North Rhine-Westphalia in 2006 at 60.3% of eligible students and the highest in Berlin in 
2004 at 93.7%. 
 Figure 1 provides a visual display of variation within and across the Länder during the 
time periods examined. It shows significant variation in outcomes between the Länder both in 
areas of legislative competence, and those where the Länder have implementation 
responsibilities. For example, Brandenburg and Schleswig-Holstein are at two ends of a wide 
extent of variation in naturalisation rates (Figure 1a). There is a similar picture on prison 
occupancy (Figure 1b) and university enrolment (Figure 1d). While most of the Länder share 
similar data values at the low end of Beamte salaries (Figure 1c), this is a product of earlier 
part of the time period when the federal government set pay and bonus levels. The box plots 
in Figure 1 demonstrate that variation is not solely a product of differences between the 
Länder, but also of variation within each Land over time.  
 Figure 2 presents the variation for each policy outcome over time. The variation of 
naturalisation rates is fairly consistent from 2003-06 with a slightly smaller spread of 
variation from 2007-10 (Figure 2a). Given this is an area with a standard federal legislative 
framework, the considerable extent of variation suggests that significant policy discretion is 
applied in the Länder at the implementation stage. While prison occupancy rates show a 
similar level of variation over time, median values shift noticeably from year-to-year (Figure 
2b). Each year some Länder have prisons below full capacity while others exceed capacity. 
The box plot in Figure 1b shows that almost all of the Länder had periods both under and 
over capacity, suggesting that short-term factors, and not just long-term infrastructure issues, 
impact on occupancy. There is some indication that occupancy rates have decreased a little 
since the 2006 reforms, though change is not yet pronounced.  As Beamte salaries transferred 
from federal to Länder legislative competence, variations begin to appear, though it is not 
until 2008 that these become significant. University enrolment rates also vary significantly 
over time (Figure 2d). While both the average enrolment rate and extent of variation have 
decreased over time, in 2010 there were still noticeable differences in enrolment rates ranging 
from a low of 61% in Thuringia to 84% in Bavaria. 
 In summary, there are clear and considerable differences present for each indicator, 
both in transferred and delegated competences, and with emerging signs that reforms in 2006 
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have opened up scope for further variation. This in itself is a notable observation given – as 
was mentioned above – that discussion of such Land-by-Land difference is generally absent 
in work within the conventional paradigm of German federalism.  
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Figure 1: Variation across the Länder, Over Time for Policy Outcomes 
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Figure 2: Variation over Time for Policy Outcomes  
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EXPLAINING VARIATION: THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 Our aim is not simply to document, but to begin to explain policy variation. Regional 
policy variation is not a field with a rich theoretical grounding. There is as yet little work on 
policy variation in German federalism, and much of what exists is case study work on one 
policy area with little commonality (and comparability) of approach across different areas.7 
As a result – and with the notable exception of the pioneering but subsequently largely 
neglected analysis of Manfred Schmidt (1980) – there are no obvious theoretical models in 
the German federalism literature that might have application across a range of policy fields. 
Significantly Schmidt drew heavily on comparative work on welfare states and on patterns of 
policy variation within the US which took the US states as units of analysis. Like Schmidt we 
look to ideas in wider literatures that might be applied to regional policy variation in 
Germany, identifying connections with recent work on Germany which suggest they can 
usefully be applied in the German case. In such literatures – comparing across states, and 
comparing federal units within states - three concepts consistently (Myles and Quandango 
2002; Pierson 1991) reoccur as explanations for policy variation: socio-economic context, 
partisan politics and the institutional features of the political system.  
 Below we suggest ways of operationalising these concepts in order then to build a 
parsimonious explanatory model that explores the association of these variables relative to 
variation in policy outcome indicators. We recognise that three independent variables cannot 
establish a comprehensive explanatory model. So we present a more fully specified model 
with controls in Appendix A in the online materials associated with this article. As the 
substantive implications of both models are very similar, we focus, for reasons of space, on 
the parsimonious model. We recognise that even the more fully specified model cannot 
capture all the contextual variables which impact on outcomes in each of our four fields. 
Nonetheless these simple models raise significant questions about the dominant 
understanding of German federalism.  
 The first prompt we take from the comparative literature concerns socio-economic 
context. Following a functionalist argument, policies of any type are the product of economic 
resources and competing demands for those resources. Various socio-economic factors are 
said to influence how governments prioritize policy areas, including wealth, unemployment, 
and the size of dependent populations.8 Comparative studies of policy choices across nation-
states have shown that levels of wealth impact the balance between ‘core’ public goods like 
defence and public order and policies with more selective outcomes, including many of the 
features of contemporary welfare states (see e.g. Huber and Stephens 1993, 2001; Crepaz, 
1998; Milesi-Ferretti et al. 2002; Bräuninger 2005; Iversen and Soskice 2006; Brooks and 
Manza 2007; Müller 2009). In analogy to this work, and echoing Wolf and Hildebrandt’s 
(2008) findings from their recent collection of sectoral analyses of policy variation in the 
Länder, we expect the particular socio-economic context facing a Land to condition its policy 
choices and outcomes. In the model below we use real Gross Domestic Product per capita 
(GDP/capita), measured in €10,000/capita, to capture socio-economic context. Our general 
expectation is that greater GDP/capita will enable greater focus on policies with targeted 
goods benefiting particular social groups. 
 A second concept commonly deployed in comparative analyses is the institutional 
context in which policy decisions are made and implemented. Different states have different 
institutional designs. Institutional structures may introduce greater or fewer actors into the 
decision-making process and affect policy outcomes. As more actors enter the decision 
making process, a greater need for negotiation is required to pass and implement legislation 
where each actor attempts to secure benefits for their particular constituency. Institutions that 
introduce a higher number of actors into the decision making process are frequently referred 
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to as veto players, veto points, or institutions increasing policy resoluteness (Tsebelis 1995; 
Immergut 1990; Cox and McCubbins 2001; Wagschal and Welzelburger 2009). Recent work 
has shown that there are significant variations in institutional structure in the Länder, not 
least in Freitag and Vatter’s (2008) adaptation of Lijphart’s typology of democratic systems 
(1984, 1999). Following approaches similar to those of Huber and Stephens (1993, 2001) and 
Brooks and Manza (2007) we have developed an additive index which aggregates the number 
of institutional characteristics that create veto-playing opportunities in the German Länder 
ranging from zero (none of the characteristics) to five (all of them: Pure Proportional 
Representation, Effective Number of Parties greater than two, minimum winning coalition 
government, Sainte- Laguë remainder rule, open party lists). Details on how the index is 
created are available in Appendix B in the online materials. The general expectation is that 
more institutional constraints focus policy agendas on the needs and interests of particular 
groups in society. 
 The third independent variable concerns the role of party politics on policy, again 
echoing a long-standing theme in comparative analysis: parties matter (Blais 1993; Schmidt 
1996; Castles 1998). We expect election outcomes (i.e., the particular party-political 
composition of Land parliaments), to impact public policy outcomes, as was Schmidt’s 
(1980) main finding decades ago and as others (Turner 2011; Bräuninger and Debus 2012; 
Tepe and Vanhuysse 2013) have recently reiterated. Our measure is the number of seats held 
in each Land legislature each year by centre-left/left wing parties (SPD, Greens and 
PDS/Left), following similar approaches in the welfare literature (Huber and Stephens 2001; 
Iversen and Soskice 2006; Brooks and Manza 2007) and recent work on Germany (Debus, 
Knill and Tosun 2013).9 Our general expectation – consistent with comparative work on 
welfare states and in the Comparative Manifestos Project - is that the stronger the presence of 
left parties, the greater the policy focus on particular group interests (while parties on the 
right focus on more traditional and broader agendas such as defence and public order – e.g. 
Tepe and Vanhuysse 2013).10 
Table 2: Independent Variables 
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum N 
Real GDP/Capita 2.67 0.75 1.77 4.73 160 
Institutional Constraint 1.64 1.17 0.00 5.00 160 
Strength of Left Parties  48.85 9.44 24.85 72.00 160 
Note: Data has been collected for the period 1999-2010. 
 
 The independent variables present a mix of structural conditions (socio-economic 
context, institutional structures) largely beyond the short term influence of governments, and 
of shorter term agency (decisions by regional electorates which periodically renew the 
partisan configuration of regional parliaments). Table 2 shows that each variable differs 
considerably across the Länder over the period studied. Most of the variation in real 
GDP/capita exists as differences between the Länder. Such variations are now much wider 
than they were before German unification in 1990. But each of the Länder also demonstrates 
variation in real GDP/capita over time. Our institutional scale reflects the differences in 
institutional structure inherent in a federal system built ‘from the bottom up’ as the Länder 
were established in the late 1940s. But it also includes components that change with each 
election. The strength of left parties reflects the choices made by voters in Land-level 
elections. Some Länder have been long-term strongholds of the left (or of the right, with 
consequent lower representation of the left); nonetheless there remain significant within-Land 
variations from election to election. Variation exists not only between each of the Länder for 
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each variable but also within each Land over time, as is shown graphically in Appendix C 
online.  
Based on the general expectations found in the literature we can generate more explicit 
hypotheses regarding our independent variables and policy outcomes. Each of the policy 
outcomes selected engages specific social interests within each Land. While public order and 
safety is a general concern for the population at large, the severity of penalties and prison 
environments affect only a portion of society. While education policies have a general 
resonance, those aspects affecting higher education target a smaller portion of the general 
public who have the inclination and ability to proceed to university. Migrants seeking 
citizenship are a small group with very specific concerns. Beamte pay levels reflect the 
interests of a narrow group, providing little direct benefit for the wider population. Overall, 
we expect higher values for the three variables of socio-economic context, left parties in 
office, and institutional design to be associated with higher values for university enrolment, 
naturalisation rates, and Beamte pay, but with lower levels of prison occupancy rates. 
a) Socio-economic context – Stronger economic performance enables a move beyond 
‘core’ public goods to policy domains that target particular groups. With additional 
resources Land governments can provide alternative methods of incarceration to 
address the concerns of prison advocacy groups, allow more immigrants to be 
naturalised, expand access to higher education, and provide more incentives for 
Beamte through better wages. 
b) Institutional context – The greater the number of institutional access/veto points in a 
Land, the more opportunities groups have to capture the policy agenda and promote 
particular interests: advocacy groups promoting the rights of convicted criminals, 
immigrants, high school students seeking access to university, and government 
employees. 
c) Left parties –As parties with similar ideological leanings gain control in governments 
they are in a better position to promote their party platforms. We expect that greater 
strength of left-leaning parties will be associated with lower prison occupancy and 
higher naturalisation rates (with left parties conventionally ‘softer’ on crime and more 
open to immigration), widening access to higher education, and higher pay rates as 
they are amenable to claims of highly unionised employees (Beamte). 
RESULTS 
 
 Table 3 presents the results of standard OLS regression models with panel-corrected 
errors which explore the impact of our independent variables on each policy outcome 
indicator.11 In addition we have included a year variable to help us to track any general 
patterns of change over time not captured by the other variables in the model. Each 
independent variable is lagged by two years to allow it time to influence policy outcomes.12  
 The results show, with two exceptions, that the independent variables have a 
statistically significant association at least at the 0.05 level. Higher levels of GDP/capita are 
associated with lower prison occupancy rates, lower levels of Beamte pay, and higher 
naturalisation and university enrolment rates.  The findings on GDP/capita lend support to 
our previously outlined expectations for three of our four indicators (prison occupancy, 
naturalisation rates, and university enrolment).  However, our parsimonious model in Table 3 
for Beamte pay runs counter to our expectations, though this appears to be an artefact of 
limited data availability since the reforms went into place.13 
 In our models institutional constraints have a statistically significant association with 
two of our selected outcomes. More institutional constraints are associated with higher 
naturalisation rates and higher levels of public sector pay. However, institutional constraints 
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did not have a statistically significant association with prison occupancy or university 
enrolment.  
 Finally, greater electoral strength of left-leaning parties is associated with lower 
prison occupancy, Beamte pay and university enrolment, and higher naturalisation rates. 
Although we hypothesised that parties of the left would support pay claims of Beamte, it may 
be they are in fact less open to competing on pay, and choose to prioritise other areas of 
expenditure.  For example, in interviews with Beamte representatives we heard that, because 
Beamte are banned from striking they have limited bargaining power, and are seen as a more 
conservative part of the public sector, left parties in government may choose not to promote 
their interests.14  The finding that parties of the left are associated with lower levels of higher 
education enrolment, while perhaps counter-intuitive, finds an echo in recent studies which 
find education expenditure is more of a priority for the right in the German Länder (Wolf 
2009; Rauh et al. 2011). It may be that, as in other areas (e.g. Tepe and Vanhuysse 2013), 
inherited assumptions about the priorities of left parties require revision.  
 The year variable indicates that all else being held constant there are, over time, 
decreasing prison occupancy, naturalisation and university enrolment rates in the period 
under examination, but increases in Beamte pay. 
Table 3: What Causes Variation? 
  
Prison 
Occupancy Rates 
Naturalisation 
Rates 
Beamte 
Pay Level 
University 
Enrolment 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
 (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) 
  P-value  P-value  P-value  P-value 
GDP/Capita   -0.057*** 0.161*** -16.114** 4.657*** 
 (0.010) (0.045)    (8.056)  (0.839) 
 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.000 
Left Parties   -0.005*** 0.007** -1.240** -0.059** 
 (0.0004) (0.003)   (0.456)  (0.030) 
 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.050 
Institutions 0.002 0.144*** 20.255*** 0.313 
 (0.006) (0.036)    (5.291)   (0.599) 
 0.733 0.000 0.000 0.601 
Year†   -0.012** -0.035** 30.901*** -0.831*** 
 (0.004) (0.013)   (3.654)   (0.209) 
  0.003 0.008 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.3764 0.2712 0.7500 0.4109 
Adj. R2 0.3603 0.2475 0.7435 0.3918 
N 160 128 160 128 
† indicates a two-tailed test; * p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.001. 
 
 Though these are deliberately simple models the R2 figures on prison occupancy and 
especially public service pay explain relatively high (and on prisons and naturalisation 
significant) proportions of the variation in our policy outcome indicators. Most of the 
relationships between the independent and dependent variables confirm our expectations. 
Some do not. Nonetheless, our findings offer significant challenge to conventional 
understandings of German federalism.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
In the areas we have explored here policy outcomes in the Länder are more diverse 
than is generally recognised. Throwing light onto this variation and building explanations for 
it allows us to return to the competing paradigms of German federalism discussed at the 
outset and themes of power dispersion, coordination and control. Table 3 suggests that much 
of the variation we have identified is ‘structural’ in its causes, reflecting (clearly) differences 
in economic performance, and (partly) differences in institutional configuration in the 
Länder. Insofar as variation is structural, it need not challenge the conventional view of 
German federalism as a highly focused effort to achieve as common a set of outcomes across 
Germany as a finely tuned intergovernmental coordination system can manage. That system 
might be seen to be falling short and require remedy, or alternatively to need to face up to the 
immense structural differences post-unification and set its sights lower. But German 
federalism would remain within its conventional paradigm, geared to coping with the power 
dispersion inherent in the distribution of powers in a federal system through intense 
coordination among Germany’s governments. 
However, the data presented here also suggests that a significant part of the variation 
reflects agency: the collective preferences of Länder electorates as mediated through the 
parties they elect. Insofar as variation reflects agency, it challenges the conventional view of 
German federalism, and resonates with the alternative paradigm of innovation and diversity 
that sees the Länder making (unexpectedly vigorous) use of dispersed powers and – as in the 
2006 reforms – arguing for more. In this light the conventional paradigm of German 
federalism as a highly integrated system geared to broadly common outcomes appears 
inappropriate or at least insufficient. Coping with power dispersion appears much more to be 
about recognising (and embracing?) more fully the depth and scope of autonomous decision-
making responsibilities in the Länder and understanding better the costs and benefits of 
autonomy, limiting the former and maximising the latter. In that sense that the Länder may 
be, as we suggested at the outset, as appropriate or perhaps ‘better’ platforms for delivering 
public policies as the highly coordinated, national politics of German federalism.15 
We do not though propose an either-or contest between the conventional paradigm of 
uniformity, coordination and control and the alternative paradigm of diversity, variation and 
autonomy. Just as we are clear from the analysis here that German federalism is not entirely 
consumed in a struggle to coordinate away the effects of structural differences, we are clear 
too that it is not entirely geared to a new practice of boundless competition and innovation. 
As research on policy variation unfolds, our expectation is that we will find a co-existence of 
two federalisms, in which different policy areas conform more to the one paradigm than the 
other, and different Länder align themselves to the one paradigm over the other. What is 
striking in the German federalism literature hitherto is that the (dominant) uniformity 
paradigm and the (challenger) diversity paradigm barely engage with one another, but remain 
bound up in disciplinary and generational differences. Our findings may offer a bridge 
between these camps and open up a route towards a more differentiated and, we suspect, a 
more accurate framing of German federalism as both highly coordinated and increasingly 
diverse.  
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NOTES 
1. This article reports on a German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD)-funded 
research project on ‘Reframing German Federalism.’ We are grateful to the DAAD 
for its support. 
2. BKA-Statistik. Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Annual 
Reports 2001-10. 
3. Öffentlicher Dienst.info http://oeffentlicher-dienst.info/beamte/. Accessed 3 June 
2013. 
4. Statistisches Bundesamt. 2011. “Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit.”  
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegr
ation/Migrationshintergrund2010220107004.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. Accessed 3 
June 2013.  
5. Bildungsbericht. Bildung in Deutschland 2012. Table F1-1A: Übergangsquoten in die 
Hochschule 1980 bis 2010 nach Ländern, Geschlecht, Art der Hochschulreife und 
Migrationshintergrund (in %). www.bildungsbericht.de/daten2012/f1_2012.xls  . 
Accessed 3 June 2013. 
6. This pay level was taken as an example to highlight variation in pay rates. Other more 
senior levels of seniority were examined and produced similar results. 
7. See for example the contributions to Hildebrandt and Wolf (2008). 
8. In the fuller model in Appendix A in addition to GDP/capita we include 
unemployment rates, size of the youth and elderly populations, and Länder fiscal 
equalization (in Euros and proportion given/received). 
9. In Appendix A we also include other measures to represent the preferences of citizens 
including an east-west dummy variable, the proportion of Catholics in each Länder as 
a proxy for social conservatism, and whether the Land Government was controlled by 
a Left party.  
10. Pappi and Seher (2009) examined left/right preferences between parties by policy area 
in Germany and produced similar results to the Comparative Manifestos Project 
(CMP), suggesting that at least in the fields of social affairs, foreign affairs, 
education, and the interior and justice there are clear left/right divides consistent with 
the operationalization used here. Additionally, the literature suggests there is not a 
large difference between policy positions for state versus national parties Müller 
(2012). Furthermore, if we used the CMP data to assign left/right party leanings, in 
order to create a single variable representing the partisanship of the government we 
would have weighted the proportion of seats held by each party by their party 
manifesto score to create an overall score. This score would likely produce similar 
results to the aggregate proportion of seats, as the left parties take on positive values 
in the manifesto dataset and the right parties take on negative values.  
11. Lags for prior year policy outcomes were omitted from the model for two reasons. 
First, the lag would create models that would allow us to compare differences in the 
change of each outcome between the Länder, while our interest is in comparing 
differences between the levels. Second the use of lags would increase predictive 
power, but as both the independent and dependent variables are slow to change over 
time, the inclusion of the lags would be highly collinear with the independent 
variables in the model making it difficult to determine the relationship between 
potential sources of variation and the outcomes. 
12. The lag structure follows that proposed by Klingemann et al. (1994) where one year is  
required to influence the policy process and another is required for the changes to 
policy to take effect. However, similar results are achieved when a one year lag 
structure is used. 
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13. The potentially counter-intuitive finding for the relationship between real GDP/Capita 
and Beamte salaries can be accounted for by two key points. First the newly 
introduced reforms have only recently begun to allow for variation in pay relative to 
wealth. For over half the years we examine, regardless of wealth, pay levels were 
relatively uniform, limiting the variation present between the two variables. If we 
examine from 2008 forward there is a more positive association between wealth and 
pay, however, it is not strong enough to overcome the pull of the first half of the 
sample of data at this time and prevents a positive correlation from appearing. 
Additionally the strength of left parties in office and institutional constraints has a 
high degree of multicollinearity with GDP/capita making it difficult to parse out the 
association between GDP/Capita and Beamte salaries.  
14. Interviews with Land chairs of German Beamte Confederation, 6th Nov 2012, 3rd Dec 
2012. 
15. In qualitative research conducted as part of this project it does not appear, for 
example, that new competences won in the 2006 reforms have led to any reduction in 
policy standards, as many had feared. If anything, the opposite appears to be the case 
(Rowe and Turner 2013). 
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APPENDIX A: MODEL RESULTS FOR FULLER SPECIFICATION 
FIGURE A.1: Regression Model Results 
 
  
Prison Occupancy 
Rates Naturalisation Rates Beamte Pay Level University Enrolment 
 Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  
 (s.e.) P-value (s.e.) P-value (s.e.) P-value (s.e.) P-value 
Real GDP/Capita -0.099 0.000 -0.487 0.000 -61.498 0.000 3.385 0.012 
 (0.013)  (0.130)  (11.131)  (1.584)  
Unemployment Rate 0.006 0.100 -0.028 0.012 -13.407 0.000 -0.450 0.064 
 (0.005)  (0.013)  (3.037)  (0.296)  
Fiscal Equalisation -0.002 0.000 -0.007 0.032 -0.379 0.206 0.015 0.378 
 (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.461)  (0.047)  
Youth Population -0.024 0.002 0.033 0.289 -9.283 0.015 -2.596 0.000 
 (0.008)  (0.059)  (4.289)  (0.590)  
Institutional Constraints 0.004 0.260 0.237 0.000 40.183 0.000 -0.873 0.162 
 (0.006)  (0.051)  (5.449)  (0.624)  
Leftist Parties in Office -0.004 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.799 0.005 -0.118 0.003 
 (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.304)  (0.042)  
Catholic Population 0.001 0.074 -0.011 0.000 0.371 0.030 -0.089 0.000 
 (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.197)  (0.018)  
Eastern Länder -0.149 0.000 -1.012 0.000 38.850 0.092 -10.447 0.001 
 (0.029)  (0.240)  (29.253)  (3.246)  
Year -0.016 0.002 -0.038 0.015 26.256 0.000 -1.521 0.000 
 (0.005)  (0.018)  (3.149)  (0.270)  
R2   0.4566   0.7022   0.8423   0.4984 
Adj. R2  0.4240  0.6794  0.8328  0.4601 
N   160   128   160   128 
 
 
In order to control for other potential factors associated with the four policy outcomes 
examined in the paper, an alternative model specification was run including additional 
variables. In the parsimonious model specifications presented in Table 3, a single variable 
was used to capture the association between three separate concepts (socio-economic 
constraints, political preferences, and institutional designs) argued in the literature to be 
associated with policy decisions and outcomes. To include a more exhaustive list of socio-
economic factors the unemployment rate (Crepaz 1998; Huber and Stephens 2000, 2001; 
Bräuninger 2005; Iversen and Soskice 2006; Shelton 2007), the proportion of the population 
under the age of 15 (Huber and Stephens 2000, 2001; Chang 2008), and the proportion of 
Länder fiscal equalization that a Land gave or received was included. Data on all three 
variables was taken from the German Federal Statistics Office. The proportion of the 
population over the age of 65 and purchasing power parity was also included in an additional 
specification but were found to not have a statistically significant relationship with the 
outcomes under examination or to contribute to the total variance explained and were 
therefore omitted from the final model. 
 
Two additional measures were included in the model runs presented in Table A.1 to capture 
additional aspects of political preferences including the proportion of Catholics in a Land and 
a dummy variable indicating whether or not a Land belonged to the East or the West as 
proxies for the existing political cultures (Almond and Verba 1965; Inglehart 1990; Inglehart 
and Abramson 1995; Goren 2004; Norris 2004; Goerres and Tepe 2011). The proportion of 
Catholics was used as a proxy for social conservativism, with data obtained from the 
Secretariat of German Bishops. An additional run included a variable denoting whether or not 
the government was controlled by a party from the Left, however, it was found not to be 
statistically associated with the outcomes examined in the paper and did not contribute to the 
variance explained and was omitted from the final model run.  
 
The inclusion of additional variables listed in Table A.1 helped to increase the variance 
explained for each of the policy outcomes. Further, while the additional variables increased 
the explanatory strength of the model specifications, it did not change the majority of the 
results previously found in the more parsimonious model specification presented in the paper 
in Table 3. In both the parsimonious and fuller model specifications, the statistical 
significance of each variable did not change.  
 
There are two situations however, where the regression coefficients differ. In the 
parsimonious model for naturalisation rates higher levels of real GDP/capita were associated 
with higher levels of naturalisation rates, while in the fuller specification presented in Table 
A.1 real GDP/capita carries a negatively signed coefficient. The change in sign is likely a 
product of the high degree of collinearity between real GDP/capita and the unemployment 
rate present in the fuller model. The second change is the sign for the proportion of leftist 
parties in office for Beamte PayLevel. In the parsimonious model the proportion of leftist 
parties in office carries a negative sign while in the fuller model specification in Table A.1 it 
carries a positive sign which supports prior expectations for the priorities of leftists parties 
presented in the paper. The difference in results is likely a product again of a collinearity 
issue between the strength of left parties in office and the other independent variables in the 
model. 
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APPENDIX B: INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
The following provides a more detailed look into the creation of the institutional constraint 
index used in the paper. Institutional constraints are institutional designs or outcomes that 
increase the difficultly for governments to agree on and pass legislation; alternatively referred 
to as veto players (Tsebelis 1995), veto points (Immergut 1990), or consensual institutions 
(Lijphart 1999). Institutional constraints can be thought of as items that increase the number 
of preferences or actors present in the decision making process. By increasing the number of 
actors with a voice on policy it makes it more difficult for any particular set of actors to shift 
policy in a direction that favours their specific interests to the determent of others following 
the veto players or more accurately the veto points argument. 
 
The scale created here ranges from zero to five where the presence of a trait that increase the 
number of actors with a voice in the decision making process is scored as a one. The scale 
adds together the number of traits each Land has to represent the number of constraints 
present in a given year following the approach used by Huber and Stephens (1993, 2001, 
2003) and Brooks and Manza (2007). 
 
The traits that were used in the index include: 
 
PPR versus PR: pure proportional representation (PR) systems are scored as a one.  
PPR systems produce a slightly more majoritarian outcome that has to be 
adjusted through various additional mechanisms (Massicotte 2003). 
Effective Number of Parties: Although multiple parties may be present in the  
legislature, if one party holds the majority of seats, smaller parties are in less 
of a position to set the agenda. When the effective number of parties is greater 
than 2 this variable receives a one. 
Minimum Winning Coalition: When the ruling coalition holds a majority of seats it  
should be able to pass legislation as each Land uses simple majority voting 
rules. Therefore, when the minimum winning coalition holds less than 51% of 
the seats in the legislature it must work with those outside the coalition. 
Cabinets that hold less than 51% of the seats in the legislature are scored as a 
one. 
Remainder Rule: There is a degree of variation in the rules used to allocate  
remaining seats in the legislature. The literature notes that the Sainte-Laguë 
rule produce a more proportional outcome (and increases the number of actors 
with different preferences) than the d’Hondt (or Hare-Nremeyer) approach 
(Massicotte 2003). Länder that use the Sainte-Laguë rule are scored as a one. 
Open versus Closed Party Lists: Open party lists allow the candidates a greater degree  
of autonomy from the party line than closed lists (where the part determines 
the order of appointment). Therefore, open list rules receive a score of one. 
 
#Constraints=PR+ENP+MWC+Remainder+Open 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.1: Distribution of Traits 
 
Each of the components used to construct the index demonstrates variation across the Länder. 
Figure B.1 demonstrates the variation providing the number of times each trait is observed. 
The institutional constraint variable was calculated for each Land-year allowing for changes 
in the effective number of parties and minimum winning coalition variables. The scale has a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.5814 which produces a higher level of internal reliability regarding the 
scaled items used compared the alternative measure produced by Freitag and Vatter (2009). 
Using the data provided in the work by Freitag and Vatter (2009) we recreated their measure 
of institutional variation by running a factor analysis using principle component factor 
method with a varimax rotation. However, an examination of their data revealed an internal 
reliability of the set of variables used (i.e., Chronbach’s alpha) of only 0.128 and a Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin estimate which indicates the level of commonality between the variables of 
0.3623 which below traditionally acceptable levels of 0.50. 
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Figure B.2: Distribution of Institutional Constraints across the Länder (2001- 
10) 
  
 
Figure B.2 shows the distribution in the number of institutional constraints over the time 
period examined in the paper. We see that over the time period there is a range in the number 
of institutional constraints present across the Länder with the modal number of constraints at 
1 and ranging from 0 (in Brandenburg from 2001-10) to 5 (in Hamburg 2002-10). 
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Figure B.3: Average Number of Institutional Constraints by Land 
 
Finally, Figure B.3 shows the mean number of institutional constraints present in each 
Länder from 2001-10. Figure B.3 demonstrates that the full potential range of values from 
zero to five is observed with many states varying between one and two constraints over the 
time period, which is indicated by the mean location between the values of one and two. 
Additionally, Bremen varies between three and four constraints and Hamburg between four 
and five. 
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APPENDIX C: Variation in Independent Variables by Länder 
 
Figure C.1: Variation in Real GDP/Capita by Länder over Time 
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Figure C.2: Variation in the Strength of Left by Länder over Time 
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Figure C.3: Variation in Institutional Constraints by Länder over Time 
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APPENDIX D: MARGINAL EFFECTS PLOTS 
 
Figure D.1: Marginal Effects Plots for Prison Occupancy Rates 
 
Figure D.1 provides a graphical display for the marginal effects for each of the three independent variables included in the model runs presented 
in Table 3 for prison occupancy rates. Over the observed values for real GDP/capita (in 10,000 Euros), holding the proportion of leftist parties at 
its mean value and institutional constraints at it median value, as real GDP/capita increases, the predicted value for occupancy rates decreases. A 
similar pattern is observed over the observed range of leftist parties in office, where real GDP/capita is held at its mean value and institutional 
constraint variable is held at its median value. In this model specification for occupancy rates institutional constraints was found to not be 
statistically associated with occupancy rates, holding real GDP/capita and the proportion of leftist parties in office at mean values, the 
confidence interval shows a potential positive or negative association over the range of possible values. Unlike real GDP/Capita and the 
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proportion of leftist parties in office, the institutional constraint variable is not continuous and is therefore not plotted with a line. Instead, the 
predicted values for each of the outcomes at the different discrete values of the constraint variable are plotted with points and confidence 
intervals around those values in Figures D.1-D.4. 
 
 
 
Figure D.2: Marginal Effects Plots for Naturalisation Rates 
 
Figure D.2 provides a graphical display for the marginal effects for each of the three independent variables included in the model runs presented 
in Table 3 for naturalisation rates. Over the observed values for real GDP/capita (in 10,000 Euros), holding the proportion of leftist parties at its 
mean value and institutional constraints at it median value, as real GDP/capita increases, the predicted value for naturalisation rates increase. A 
similar pattern is observed over the observed range of leftist parties in office, where real GDP/capita is held at its mean value and institutional 
constraint variable is held at its median value. Holding real GDP/capita and the proportion of leftist parties in office at mean values, more 
institutional constraints are observed to carry a positive association with naturalisation rates. 
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Figure D.3: Marginal Effects Plots for Beamte Pay Level 
 
Figure D.3 provides a graphical display for the marginal effects for each of the three independent variables included in the model runs presented 
in Table 3 for Beamte pay. Over the observed values for real GDP/capita (in 10,000 Euros), holding the proportion of leftist parties at its mean 
value and institutional constraints at its median value, higher levels of real GDP/capita are associated with lower predicted value for Beamte pay. 
A similar pattern is observed over the observed range of leftist parties in office, where real GDP/capita is held at its mean value and institutional 
constraint variable is held at its median value. Holding real GDP/capita and the proportion of leftist parties in office at mean values, more 
institutional constraints is observed to carry a positive association with Beamte pay. 
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Figure D.4: Marginal Effects Plots for University Enrolment 
 
 
Figure D.4 provides a graphical display for the marginal effects for each of the three independent variables included in the model runs presented 
in Table 3 for the proportion of eligible students enrolling in university. Over the observed values for real GDP/capita (in 10,000 Euros), holding 
the proportion of leftist parties at its mean value and institutional constraints at its median value, higher levels of GDP/capita are associated with 
higher predicted values for university enrolment. The opposite pattern is found over the observed range of leftist parties in office; where real 
GDP/capita is held at its mean value and institutional constraint variable is held at its median value, an increase in the proportion of seats held by 
leftist parties is associated with a decrease in predict university enrolment. In this model specification for university enrolment, institutional 
constraints was found to not be statistically associated with changes in enrolment, holding real GDP/capita and the proportion of leftist parties in 
office at mean values, the confidence interval shows a potential positive or negative association over the range of possible values. 
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